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to consumers, from which these as part-
ners received the entire profits of the
enterprise. From the success of its mod-
est beginnings the movement has made
great strides, until today it has not only
captured a large percentage of Britain's
retail trade (in which it sells everything
from baby's outfits to funeral furnish-
ings), but has also its own federal dairy,
laundry, coal, and insurance societies, as
well as the biggest baking plant in the
British empire. Under the exigencies of
competition with private business, the
movement has expanded from retail to
wholesale trade, thence to the field of
production, to banking, and to the de-
velopment of a press and a Cooperative
Political Party. Federal organization has
been the cooperators' answer to private
capitalist concentration.
By subordinating his own ideas to the
positive presentation of facts, Mr. Elliott
has avoided the risks of partisan propa-
ganda and acrimonious criticism of op-
ponets. For a time, indeed, the con-
sumers' cooperative movement enjoyed
an advantage over trade unionism and
political socialism, its allies, in not arous-
ing organized opposition. In a democratic
society few will openly challenge the
worker's right to spend what he earns
where he pleases. Hence if he chooses
to spend his money at a cooperative store
that returns dividends on purchases, and
to become a shareholder in it for saving
and insurance benefits, his efforts at self-
help can hardly be criticized. Neverthe-
less in recent years the rising tide of
restrictive legislation and of active hos-
tility to cooperatives on the part of pri-
vate trade associations, the Government,
and the newspapers testifies unmistak-
ably to their threat to big business.
In reply, the British cooperatives have
launched a Ten Year Plan with the object
not only of unifying, enlightening, and
enlarging their membership, but of trans-
forming their policy from one of passive
protection of the consumer to an active
offensive in his behalf. The sphere of
production especially remains to be con-
quered. Cooperators have to develop
* Professor of Philosophy, Washington Square
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more efficient vertical combinations, to
collectivize processes from the extraction
of raw materials to the final delivery of
the finished product. Their aim is to per-
meate the whole marketing structure,
both in order to gain a deciding voice in
fixing prices and costs, and to bring es-
sential commodities under effective pub-
lic control. One of the author's most in-
teresting chapters analyzes the democratic
organization of the movement as a work-
ing unity; from its roots in thousands of
autonomous local societies voluntarily
linked to farmers' associations, collective
factories and wholesale groups up to its
national directive agency in the Coop-
erative Union.
Whether Mr. Elliott is justified in
claiming all that he does for the move-
ment-whether its power is great enough
to bring the economic goods of life under
public control by the simple expedient of
cooperative competition with private bus-
iness -(thus rendering the supersession of
capitalism by statutory means unneces-
sary)-may be questioned; yet its im-
portance as an ally of trade unions and
such political organizations as the British
Labor Party, and as a technique for train-
ing the public in the arts of economic
combination and business administration,
can hardly be overestimated.
MARIE SWABEY.*
RESTATEDVIENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY,
The American Law Institute. St. Paul:
American Law Institute Publishers.
1936. Pp. Vol. I, lxi, 503, 22; Vol. II,
liii, 675, 60.
These two latest volumes of restatement
are part of a projected five-volume clari-
fication of the law of property. Into their
making have gone eight years of labor in
the elaborate routine of the American Law
Institute and "close to $150,000."1 Most
of the work was done by or under the
supervision of Professor Richard R. Powell,
the present Reporter; Dean Harry A.
Bigelow was Reporter for the first two
and a half years and Professor W. Barton
Leach is responsible for Chapter 15 (Stat-
' Powell, Cases on Future Interests (2d ed.
1937) p. v.
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utes of Limitation). A small group of
distinguished advisers contributed col-
lectively some 28 months of work.2
The outline of the completed volumes
is simple--"almost unimpeachable" is the
accolade of one reviewer.3 Volume I is
devoted to definitions and to freehold
estates. The definitions begin with the
Hohfeldian correlatives and extend
through "interest," "legal and equitable
interests," "possessory interests," "estate,"
"owner" and so forth to "executory lim-
itations;" the material on freehold estates
treats of the. "creation" and "character-
istics" of estates in fee simple absolute,
estates in fee simple defeasible (fee simple
determinable, fee simple subject to a con-
dition subsequent, fee simple subject to
an executory limitation), estates tail,
estates in fee simple conditional and re-
lated estates, and estates for life. Volume
II defines and differentiates, with some
innovations in terminology, the various
types of future interests and treats of
their characteristics. Characteristics in-
clude transferability by conveyance inter
vivos, succession on death, subjection to
the satisfaction of claims of creditors, par-
tition, and judicially ordered sales, pro-
tection of future interests resulting from
requirements for judicial action binding
upon such interests, protection as against
acts and omissions of the owner of the
present interest, protection as against per-
sons other than the owner -of the present
interest, protection as affected by statutes
of limitation and the doctrine of prescrip-
tion, ineffectiveness of an interest in its
inception and effect thereof upon prior or
.succeeding interest, and termination of
an interest as affecting succeeding inter-
ests. For annotated appendices on dower
and curtesy as derivative estates, implica-
tion of gross remainders in deeds, the
2 Powell (1936) XIII Am. L. Inst. Proc. 117.
3 Schnebly, Book Review (1937) 37 Col. L.
Rev. 881. This review contains an excellent
critical discussion of various sections of the
Restatement.
&VoL I, p. ix.
5 (1935) XII Am. L. Inst. Proc. 273, 274. "The
Institute is committed, as I understand it, to
what may be called legal still photography.
. ..The movement cannot be reproduced ...
by still photography." Cf. 2 Restatement of
severability of a power of termination,
ineffectiveness of an ultimate executory
interest, and aspects of the law of accel-
eration and sequestration the Reporter as-
sumes sole responsibility. Later volumes
are promised on further problems in
future interests, on the social restrictions
imposed upon the creation of property in-
terests, and on servitudes.
In mechanical make-up, stated purpose,
and scope of contents this Restatement
differs little from its predecessors. Black-
letter, comment, and illustration reappear
in all their pristine rigor. The object of
the Institute is again, so the Director
writes in his introduction, to promote
"certainty, and clarity"-to prevent "the
abandonment of our common law sys-
tem" and its supercession by "rigid legis-
lative codes."' All this is to be accom-
plished by, in a phrase borrowed from
Professor Leach, "still photography" 5 of
existing law, a restatement of the "gen-
eral law of the United States"' as it is.
Nor are the Institute's anticipations of suc-
cess modest. In a special caveat in the
text appears exact expression of a senti-
ment several times echoed: "An attempt
to formulate these matters in the form of
definite rules at this time might well
crystallize the law in a manner which
would hinder progress. ' 7 Earlier in the
volume the fear is that such formulation
might "hinder development." s  In scope
of contents Professor Powell has, however,
succeeded in making a few innovations;
these volumes, with their appendices, do
contain a considerable sprinkling of his-
torical and statutory material, case dis-
cussion and reasoned comment. Yet
such interstitial contributions, necessarily
meagre and inadequate,9 fall far short of
offering either a genetic account or a crit-
ical appraisal of institutions and doctrines.
The many criticisms made of its predeces-
Property. 512, "Differences of this type may
lack logical or pragmatic justification but can-
not be overlooked or left unstated, in an at-
tempt to photograph the existing law."
iSupra note 4.
7 Vol. I, 470.
8 Ibid., 405.
9 Note one summary sentence: "Between the
enactment of this statute in 2285 and the Amer-
ican Revolution in 1776, estates tail were ex-
tremely important factors in the English social
organization." Vol I, 203.
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sors are, on the whole, valid indictments
of the Restatement of Property.
To elaborate upon the now common-
place criticisms of the earlier restatements
would be futile. Some reviewers have
pointed to naivet6 in fundamental assump-
tions-assumptions that certainty is ob-
tainable and obtainable by high abstrac-
tions, that certainty is more important
than flexibility, that "substantive law" is
all-comprehensive and designed to govern
human conduct in and out of courts, that
the defects of "the law" can be cured by
restating it as it is, that a restatement of
the law as it is is a restatement of it as it
ought to be, and so forth; others have de-
plored the omission of historical, eco-
nomic, and sociological backgrounds and
of studies of comparative experience in
other countries, the ignoring of, except
by indirection, consideration of what "the
law" ought to be, a failure to study the
social consequences of institutions and
doctrines, the omission of supporting au-
thorities, reasoned discussion, and con-
trast of conflicting opinion, the use of
"doctrinal" rather than "factual" classi-
fications and of the blackletter-comment-
illustration formula of expression, and so
forth.'0 Yet to all of these criticisms the
officials of the American Law Institute
have remained impervious. Their only
answer is that "the most claimed for the
restatement is that it represents the con-
sidered conclusion of those who have for
years been interested in a particular
branch of the law," that investigations of
fact "cost a lot of money and take a lot
of time and the legal questions in indi-
vidual cases must be answered before all
the facts can be learned," and that "many
questions of policy are incapable of dem-
onstration by any fact examination which
it is possible to make.""'
10 For excellent elaboration of a host of criti-
cism see Yntema, What Should the American
Law Institute Do? (1936) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 461;
The American Law Institute (1935) Legal Es-
says in Tribute to Orrin Kip McMurray; The
Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws
(1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 183. Cf. Clark, The Re-
statement of the Law of Contracts (1933) 42
Yale L. J. 643; Green, The Torts Restatement
(1935) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 582. Articles and re-
views are collected by Goodrich, Institute
What does "considered conclusion"
mean? Some insight- inadequate, of
course -and with it some idea of the
difficulties of restatement can be gleaned
fromithe reports of the annual meetings of
the Institute. Let us look, for example,
at "Discussion of Property, Proposed Final
Draft" in the report for 1936. Space will
permit only a few excerpts. Take first
the debate about words of inheritance.
Section 27 of the Restatement of Property
reads:
"Subject to the rules stated in §§30
and 32, a legal estate in fee simple abso-
lute is created in a natural person by
an otherwise effective conveyance inter
vivos of land if, and only if, the con-
veyance contain words of general in-
heritance with respect to the convey-
ee.")12
Illustrations to this in comment (b) are:
"A makes an otherwise effective con-
veyance inter vivos of land with a limi-
tation:
I. "to B;"
II. "to B forever;"
III. "to B in fee simple."
B in each case has an estate for his
ife."13
Discussion of this section and its illustra-
tions was not without heat:' 4
"Charles E. Clark (Connecticut): . . .
I have fought this for ten years . . .
it grows more ridiculous every time I
see it. . . . If you work down through
the Special Note you will find that at
most it can only apply to eight states;
that actually it only applies to two of
them; that it is held the other way in
four and the only states for which this
Restatement is made are the States of
Connecticut and New Mexico. . . The
Bards and Yale Reviewers (1936) 84 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 449, 450, n. 3.
"1 Goodrich, supra note 10, at 450, 452, n. 2.
Italics supplied by the reviewer.
12 Vol. I, 73;
23 Ibid., 75.
14 (1935-36) XIII The Am. L. Inst. Proc.
164-180. The report here reprinted is much
edited by the reviewer and perhaps does not
do justice to any individual speaker; but it
does, I think, carry the authentic flavor of the
entire proceedings.
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final apology . . . is that this law must
apply to the cases of states having deeds
before the statute takes effect ...
I would make two answers. The first
is that I did not suppose the Restate-
ment was directed to past history, his-
tory at least fully a generation old, if
not more, and my second is that I be-
lieve the law to be wrong as stated even
in those cases. I think that the statutes
show a general policy of the states the
other way \and there are not enough
cases of recent origin to justify such an
unrealistic statement of the law.
Mr. Rosenthal: Was not, that the
common law rule?
Mr. Clark: What is the common law?
If you say the American common law,
I doubt it very much. If you say the
common law at the present moment, I
am fairly convinced it is not so on the
mere count of noses.
Mr. Powell: . . . Dean Clark has a
most difficult situation to maintain that
the law was not as we state it prior to
the statute in the states of this country.
There are some twenty-four decisions
from some thirteen different jurisdic-
tions that lay down explicitly that the
interest in that case was not a fee be-
cause of the absence of words of in-
heritance. Even a court in Dean Clark's
own state was so foolish (in his judg-
ment) as to say that words of inheri-
tance were necessary in 1892. . .. It
seems to me that his rule is a bad rule;
but that it is the rule of this country
apart from statute. I don't like it but
I feel compelled in my responsibility to
you to report it to you as the law apart
from statute ... .
Mr. Clark: . . . I deny the count
15 "l. Powell: . . . As to the fee simple
with an executory limitation, there is a min-
ority authority supporting us and a majority
against us. There are eleven states against
us and three with us, and there are thirty-four
waiting for the announcement of the Institute
to guide them. It seems to me that under these
circumstances the Institute should throw its
weight in favor of the three. We have been
consistent at least." (1929-30) VIII The Am. L.
Inst. Proc. 288.
utterly and in toto.
Hon. George T. McDermott (Kansas):
. . . There is authority enough-I
don't care whether it is the majority-
there is authority enough in the com-
mon law to say nothing of the statute to-
support Dean Clark's position and, as
I see it, the object of this Institute is
to declare what that court would say
and not merely count cases.
Mr. Sims: . . . Personally I wish
we could rule as Dean Clark does. I
do not see how we can. ... 16
The Director: . . . I do not pretend
to be an expert on Property Law, but
I have a very fair conviction that the
meaning of words should be the intent
of the person who wrote them as inter-
preted by the surrounding circum-
stances and any such old and ridiculous
rule as this is frankly anathema to my
mentality. . . . In other words, if you
really think as Judge McDermott has
said that this rule which none of us
likes is not the existing law in the sense
that it would not be followed in any
properly presented and pertinent case
in the great majority of cases where it
would arise, then this rule. should be
changed now, and now I point out is the
last time to change it ...
Mr. Rosenthal: . . . What we have
to do it strikes me is to restate the law
as we find it, not as we would like to
have it.
Mr. Powell: The rule as Dean Clark
has stated it makes the rule operative
as to deeds and as to wills identical.
That is good sense. It is not the com-
mon law. . . . It seems to me that it is
a change highly undesirable and arises
solely from a confusion in seeing the
16 "Harry Upson Sims (Alabama): . . . Are
we, therefore in restating the law of Property,
to consider primarily a return to the old law
of Property of the Fifteenth century, or is it
the duty of this group, with the Institute back-
ing it up, to develop out of it a possible law
of property for the next hundred years. ...
So, I think, in Real Property we ought to con-
sider . . . what the law ought to be ..
Supra note 15, at 290.
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purposes of the Institute. It confuses
the effort to state the law as you would
like to see it with a statement of your
sober conviction as to how a court would
decide a case in the absence of an ap-
plicable statute. It is wishful thinking
which dictates the proposal that is
moved in the motion.
Member: . . . I am not unmindful
of what the Director has said that what
is desired here is that this group should
act as prophets in determining what.the
courts might decide under certain cir-
cumstances upon certain troublesome
legal subjects. The Lord Almighty
could not decide that question and cer-
tainly these men here assembled are not
equal to that task. I for one am not
qualified to vote on a question of
prophecy.
Mr. Pepper: Gentlemen, you have
heard the question which arises upon
the motion made by Dean Clark at the
suggestion of Judge McDermott and the
substance of it is to substitute the
language proposed by Dean Clark for
what at present appears in Blackletter
of Section 30. Is there any further de-
bate? If not, all in favor of the substi-
tute proposed by Dean Clark will say
"aye." The noes have it. The substi-
tute is lost."
Lest the above be thought unique, one
further brief example. Section 160 of the
published draft reads: "Except as stated
in §161 the owner of a power of termina-
tion in land has no power to transfer his
interest, or any part thereof, by a con-
veyance inter vivos. ' ' 17 So the rule is
stated "in spite of the belief of the Re-
porter and of some, at least, of his ad-
visers that this principle of non-transfer-
ability is a pure anachronism."s The
first sentence of Comment (c) to the
Blackletter reads: "A'power of termina-
tion is destroyed by an attempt to make
such a transfer as is forbidden by the rule
stated in this Section."1 9 Witness part of
the consideration of this obscure rule:
17 Vol. H, 574.
18 (1933) Restatement, Property (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1933) 113, 114.
10 Vol. H, 577.
20 (1935-36) XI The Am. L. Inst. Proc. 198.
"Mr. Powell: . . . I have drawn
Comment (c) in accord with the direc-
tion made by the Annual Meeting of
1933. It is as indefensible a rule as can
be formulated in words.
Judge Hand: That raising no re-
sponse, we will proceed to Section 203.
I take it we prefer to stand on what we
once said."
20
Reference to an earlier volume of the
annual reports reveals that the first sen-
tence in Comment (c) was put into its
present form by a vote of 41 to 35.21
So much for the confusion of purpose
that attends the Institute's public "con-
sideration" of its pronouncements. Cour-
tesy commonly requires that an individ-
ual author be judged by the extent to
which he succeeds in accomplishing his
chosen aim; even the Institute has been
defended upon the ground that it was
never intended that it should do what its
critics demand.22  But in a world where
funds and capacity for and interest in
legal scholarship are limited it seems not
unfair to criticize a great research organ-
ization for its choice of aims-especially
when the announced aim is a will-o'-the-
wisp that can lead only to subsidized
snark hunting. To assume that the judi-
cial handling of property problems in con-
temporary America can be made more
predictable by an authoritative canoniza-
tion and rationalization of ancient, feudal-
conditioned concepts and doctrines-of,
for examples, the distinctions between
legal and equitable, divesting ("cutting
short") and normal expiration, 23 condi-
tions subsequent and conditions precedent,
remainders and executory interests, rights
of entry and possibilities of reverter, and
so forth-is little short of fantastic. If
the investigations of fact indispensable to
reform "cost a lot of money and take a
lot of time" (compare the eight years and
"close to $150,000 above"), there is all the
more reason why an institute embodying
the best resources of the nation should
undertake such studies. Of course "ques-
tions of policy are incapable of demonstra-
21 (1932-34) XI The Am. L. Inst. Proc. 153.
22 Goble, The Restatement of the Law of
Contracts (1933) 21 Calif. L. Rev. 421.
23 See Vol. I at 43, 54, 56, 59, 60, 63, 65, 118,
119, 147, 165, 195.
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tion" by "fact examination." Demonstra-
tion belongs to the realm of logic, fact
examination to that of observation or ex-
periment, choice to that of nobody knows
what; still it is a favored prejudice of our
times that an informed judgment is more
useful than mere hunch. Certainly count-
ing cases and counting the votes of, neces-
sarily, uninformed experts are neither
new nor practicable techniques for escap-
ing confusion. Mr. Felix Cohen has
pointed to similarity in the method of the
Institute and that prescribed by Valen-
tinian's "mathematical" Law of Cita-
tions.24 Of that law Professor Buckland
writes: "These provisions show that sci-
entific study of law was a thing of the
past; they mark probably the lowest point
reached by Roman jurisprudence."2 5
These observations are not, however,
intended to suggest that the Restatement
of Property is either wholly bad or a
negligible contribution to the fruitful
study of property law. On the contrary-
it is perhaps justly described by one com-
petent critic as "the most scientific treat-
ment of its field which is available to
the profession."' ' Despite all the tiresome
repetition, some of which could have been
avoided and some not, despite the many
thin distinctions and obvious, dull, or un-
real illustrations, there is much in it that
is useful to any worker in the field and
much that cannot be found elsewhere.
Professor Powell has struggled valiantly
against the limitations of purpose and
form imposed upon him. By continued
insistence upon "rational," "symmetrical,"
and "consistent" rules, he has even been
able to work a number of reforms. No-
table examples are in the alienability- of
"contingent" remainders, executory in-
terests, and possibilities of reverter,
(§§162, 159) in the indestructibility of
"contingent" remainders, (§§239, 240) and
in the reclassification of remainders (§157;
indefeasibly vested, vested subject to open,
vested subject to complete defeasance, and
subject to a condition precedent). Many
portions of the text could be singled out
for peculiar excellence; most of the ma-
terial on the characteristics of future in-
24 Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals (1933) 5,
n. 7.
25 A Text-Book of Roman Law (1921) 35.
terests is, in fact, more informative and
stimulating than anything to be found in
orthodox treatises. The same could be
said of various sections and chapters on
freehold estates. That pretty well covers
both volumes. Technical excellence in
sacred doctrine must indeed be taken for
granted in a work subjected to so much
scrutiny by so many scholars.
It is only when the Restatement of
Property is measured by what needed to
have been done and what might have
been done that its shortcomings become
oppressive. Scholarship .in its field has
now come to a reasonably sad state. Mr.
Gray's great works were written in an
intellectual atmosphere largely incompre-
hensible to modern students; Mr. Kales'
volume is more satisfactory, but subject
to well-known limitations; Professor
Simes' recent treatise, though valuable for
results, is not long on either history or
critical analysis. What students, young
and old, of the subject need is a compre-
hensive, genetic history of the ancient
concepts, a delineation of how they came
to be what they are, both their literary
history and the social conditions that
brought them forth, and a careful, in-
formed assay of their adequacy to achieve
certain commonly accepted social ends of
our day. No one has expressed this need
more clearly than Professor Powell. In
the preface to his Cases and Materials on
Trusts and Estates he wrote:
"He (the student) needs a picture of
the past evolution of this law; of the
present day forces which are shaping
the law of the future; of the wide vari-
ety of present transactions requiring
sometimes the re-discussion of ancient
problems, sometimes the difficult process
of new thinking; of the growing statu-
tory ingredient in the law; and of the
deeper problems of social engineering
implicit in the allowance of wealth ac-
cumulations, inheritance, and testamen-
tary dispositions. ' ' 2 7
Recognition of this need appears in vari-
ous comments throughout the Restate-
ment. Perhaps it is not too much to hope
2 Schnebly, supra note 3, at 886.
27 1 Cases and Materials on Trusts and Es-
tates (1932) p. vii.
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that the Restatement may be but a prelude
to more penetrating studies and to more
effective social action. A few years ago
the then President of the Institute stated
a novel conception of its function. 'It
may be very helpful," Mr. Wickersham
said, "to state what is a recognized prin-
ciple of law in such clear and distinct
form that its bad nature becomes appar-
ent."28  More recently Professor Simes
has written: "If this statement of obscure
and complicated rules is to be of social
value, it should be followed by legislation
correcting the difficulties which have been
discovered. '29 Through its efforts to effect
certainty the Institute may-strange fate
-find itself initiating a movement to pro-
mote change.
MYREs S. McDoUGAL.*
PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, by
George Wilfred Stumberg. "Chicago:
The Foundation Press. 1937. Pp. xl,
441. $5.00.
Seven years ago, Professor Stumberg
published a progranatical article which
made him known as one of the proponents
of the so-called "functional approach" in
conflict of laws.2 Other members of this
school have published casebooks and ar-
ticles criticizing the methods of the Re-
statement, or dealing constructively with
problems of detail. Now, Professor Stum-
berg has published the first comprehen-
sive text on conflict of laws written in
the functional method.
To survey the entire field of conflict of
laws in an unconventional approach is no
easy task. An author who undertakes to
find the solution best suited to the pecu-
liar requirements of every problem would
seem to require much space for detailed
discussion. Professor Stumberg has suc-
ceeded in condensing his functional treat-
ment of the conflict of laws into slightly
more than 400 pages. It seems that his
purpose was not so much to write an ex-
haustive treatise, in which every question
would be thoroughly weighed and dis-
cussed, but to present to teachers and
students of the conflict of laws the appli-
28 (1932-34) The Am. L. Inst. Proc. 146.
29Simes, Fifty Years of Future Interests
(1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 749, 783.
* Professor of Law, Yale University.
cation of the functional method to the
most frequently recurring problems. He
has selected these problems so skillfully
that a 'survey of the entire field is given.
His style is terse, but well readable. Diffi-
culties are not shunned, but courageously
attacked.
In contrast to the "classical" school of
conflict of laws, Professor Stumberg re-
frains from formulating hard-and-fast
rules expressed in clear-cut concepts. He
states the conflicting interests which are
involved in a problem, and the policies
which may or which should move a court
to adopt one or another solution. In
speaking, for instance, of the distinction
between "substantive" and "procedural'
law, the author makes it clear that "any
classification, having as its objective de-
marcation of a definite dividing line for
the purpose of categorically isolating
through generalization, particular type
situations, is apt to be dangerous." (p.
129). Hence he states that application of
foreign rules concerning the methods of
presenting the operative facts to a court
"would require an almost impossible re-
adjustment of local judicial machinery
in the trial of a case." (p. 128). The
policy of maintaining uniformity of pro-
cedure may conflict, however, as the au-
thor points out, with the policy that
"business convenience and security de-
mand that there be a minimum of varia-
tion, because of the forum selected by the
plaintiff, in legal relations on given facts.
• . .The balance to be struck is one be-
tween the requirements of nonvariation
in legal relations because of the accidental
forum and the justifiable unwillingness
of any court to adopt in whole or in part
foreign judicial machinery." (p. 149).
Thus he reaches the conclusion that "to
treat the measure of damages, the parol
evidence rule, the statute of Frauds, and
limitation of actions as substantive would
not disturb the balance." (p. 149). Pre-
sented in such a way, the problem of dis-
tinguishing between substance and pro-
cedure no longer appears as a mysterious
process of finding "correct" definitions,
but as a conscious weighing of interests
1 Professor of Law, University of Texas.
2 Conflict of Laws, Foreign Created Rights
(1930) 8 Tex. L. Rev. 173.
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